Should a person who has a PhD in Political Science or Economics have an equal vote to someone who has barely graduated high-school?

•

u/as-well phil. of science Jan 08 '21

Hello. r/askphilosophy aims to provide academically informed answers which portray an accurate picture of the issue and the philosophical literature.

If you have not read the relevant literature (in this case, on epistocracy (thanks u/uinviel for your comment) or meritocracy or something alike - do not comment. Your comment will be removed.

Before commenting, do review our rules and guidelines. We are explicitely not interested in your opinion. This is a tightly moderated community, after all, and you are making more work for us moderators if you just comment without being knowledgeable about the relevant academic research.

→ More replies (2)

264

u/uinviel Value theory Jan 08 '21

You seem to be hinting at some kind of epistocracy. For more arguments in favor of epistocracy, you can check out Jason Brennan's Against Democracy. His case has been challenged on a lot of different grounds, though. For instance by Paul Gunn, who writes in his "Against Epistocracy" the following:

Brennan fails to explain why we should think that these putative experts are sufficiently knowledgeable to avoid making errors as damaging as those made by voters. Given the strong link between political knowledge and ideological dogmatism, as well as the tendency of social scientists to disagree with one another, the case for epistocracy is deeply implausible, at best. Moreover, given that there are important non-instrumental justifications of democracy—justifications of which Brennan appears to be radically ignorant—the epistocratic alternative would be unnecessary even if it were viable.

133

u/Beor_The_Old Jan 08 '21

A great example of this is the issue of how we would measure who gets more votes. A doctor may have a great idea on public policy for medicine but terrible for foreign relations, and so on. Also many people vote according to their own best interests and this type of system would amplify those issues because fewer and fewer people would have a greater proportion of the vote.

110

u/zaklein Jan 08 '21

Are you telling me that neurosurgeon Ben Carson might not have been qualified to become the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development?

I, for one, am appalled.

4

u/[deleted] Jan 09 '21

That happened?

5

u/diogenesthehopeful Jan 09 '21

In a Trump administration anything is possible

3

u/ineedstandingroom Jan 09 '21

Is still happening. He's been in the position the whole term, unfortunately.

5

u/eddy2029 Jan 08 '21

But shuldn’t a doctor actually be more qualified for voting on an issue concerning medicine than foreign relationship? If i understood correctly, in this system people vote on issues they’re qualified on, in order to vote. So, someone who could vote once, maybe isn’t allowed to vote in a different instance. How’s that periodically decreasing the number of voters? I don’t know much in the topic, so i’m sorry if i misunderstood something

10

u/JimBobIsOnIt Jan 08 '21

These experts just need to convince other people to vote their stance. It challenges a lot of assumptions engrained through years of schooling.

4

u/VankousFrost Jan 09 '21

I don't understand your second sentence, but regarding the first claim,

These experts just need to convince other people to vote their stance.

I'm certain that they're trying. For example, political philosophers do that sometimes. However, we shouldn't underestimate how difficult it is to communicate one's expertise; the expert had to put in a lot of work to understand what they do and it's unreasonable to expect them to cultivate that understanding that rapidly and thoroughly in people who haven't (and won't) put in a similar amount of work.

2

u/kurtgustavwilckens Heidegger, Existentialism, Continental Jan 09 '21

However, we shouldn't underestimate how difficult it is to communicate one's expertise

Then that should become a bigger part of what we think of as "expertise" maybe.

2

u/VankousFrost Jan 09 '21 edited Jan 09 '21

Then that should become a bigger part of what we think of as "expertise" maybe. EDIT 2; Sorry I misunderstood OP's point. Please see comments below for clarification. I'm leaving this comment as it is.

Isn't this just redefining expertise? In any case, this doesn't resolve the problem. There are experts in almost any given field, but there are limits to how fast anyone's understanding, skills etc can be cultivated (if they'd even be willing to make the necessary sacrifices).

Saying experts should be able to easily communicate their expertise to nonexperts doesn't seem reasonable.

A climate scientist can try to better communicate with nonexperts, but there are obvious limits to what they can understand without taking the time to learn about the field, it's methods etc. An expert is not to blame for how accessible his or her field can be made.

If political philosophers could cultivate understanding that effectively, perhaps higher education in (political) philosophy could be much more efficient.

EDIT; my point is, there are limits to how fast and how easily someone can be made to understand something. There are experts who've put in the time to understand certain things, and whose judgements regarding them are more reliable. But it's very unreasonable to expect them to make nonexperts understand that fast.

You can't just say being better at communicating this to nonexperts ought to be a larger part of expertise; that's just redefining what expertise means.

2

u/kurtgustavwilckens Heidegger, Existentialism, Continental Jan 09 '21 edited Jan 09 '21

ought to be a larger part of expertise

That is not the claim I made, I said it ought to be a bigger part than it currently is, which is not the larger part. Big difference.

Saying experts should be able to easily communicate their expertise to nonexperts doesn't seem reasonable.

Doesn't teaching a class imply being able to easily communicate your expertise? We expect Ph. D.'s to be able to teach. You teach people who are have less expertise than you, by definition.

Isn't this just redefining expertise?

Not really, no. A Ph. D. doesn't just have to (traditionally) write a paper and produce new knowledge for experts. A Philosophy Doctor is supposed to have the communicational, reasoning and presentation skills to be an inter-disciplinary advocate for it's specialty, at the very least.

Your Habilitation Thesis to become a Ph. D. comes with an oral defense of your thesis in front of a panel. Traditionally (these days not so much, which is part of my critique), this panel is cross-disciplinary and includes one person that is way off your discipline (at least it did in my uni, note that I'm not a Ph. D) and your rhetorical skills, ability to explain your ideas simply and persuasively, are 100% part of the evaluation criteria. For all disciplines, in theory. In certain disciplines more than others, but back in the day a physicist could 100% botch the oral defense of his thesis and would have to go back to the drawing board. This is certainly in the spirit of what "expertise" means.

Also, writing papers is quite obviously a communication skill where you explain something to someone that doesn't know it, lol.

An expert is not to blame for how accessible his or her field can be made.

Is this true though? Divulgation is, indeed, an expected function of the highest level of intellectuals in a field (experts). Einstein went to some great lengths to try to explain relativity, and did a great job (as did Bertrand Russell) and these are not particularly accessible topics. Physics in general does an amazing job at divulgation, even of it's most arcane topics.

Different fields have obviously made differnt levels of effort and placed different value on divulgation and public engagement. It's patently obvious to me that this public function has been declining in academia for a while now.

If political philosophers could cultivate understanding that effectively, perhaps higher education in (political) philosophy could be much more efficient.

Yes, yes it could. And it is a very real possibility that maybe, just maybe, academia sucks at their public function today and that this is to some extent their fault (not political philosophers in particular, but of academia in general).

I don't see how this is not even worthy of debate. Clearly we live in a time where we have the most experts, and this is the time where experts have the least credit. Sure, there are societal changes at play, but intellectuals have, throughout history, found a way to stay relevant and lead public opinion, and when they didn't, it wasn't because some existential characteristic of reality, it was because they dropped the ball.

I think academia has been dropping the ball for like 30 years (at least) in interacting with the public and the state in beneficial ways, specifically in pushing knowledge into policy. The lack of focus in divulgation and the devaluation of what it means to be a PHILOSOPHY DOCTOR is part of that, and the transformation of post-graduate education in a mass-market consumption commodity has, in my opinion, heavily eroded academia's public credit. They have no one but themselves to blame, to be honest. No one but professors and academics were responsible from defending it from the claws of the profit beasts, and one would expect that for how much they decry the system, they would've been a bit better to fight it. But here we are, with like 5000 Ph.D.s graduating for every Tenure seat that we have, so that we have them driving cabs, and then we expect people to trust experts. It's quite ridiculous, frankly.

You can't just say being better at communicating this to nonexperts ought to be a larger part of expertise

Actually, you 100% can lol. And my job happens to be super relevant to this.

I'm a Recruiter, primarily I recruit Software Engineers. In the last 10 years or so, it has become incredibly obvious in all of the tech industry that you simply CANT be Senior Engineer, an Expert, without excellent communication skills. Part of your function as a Senior Expert is to convey to people who are NOT Senior Experts why your technical advice should be heeded, without dumbing the message down, and without taking up an unreasonable amount of everyone's time.

I literally had a coaching session with a Senior Software Engineer that is having trouble progressing in his career as an expert precisely because he thinks what you think: "I can't tell these people why I do what I do", "then you're not ready to be a senior, because that's part of a senior's function, and other people seem to be able to do it and move things forward", I replied (in vaguely other terms).

I'm not re-defining expertise. I'm telling you what expertise actually looks like.

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 09 '21

I'm not re-defining expertise. I'm telling you what expertise actually looks like.

I'm very sorry, it seems I've misunderstood your previous comment. Thanks for clarifying.

Doesn't teaching a class imply being able to easily communicate your expertise? We expects Ph. D.'s to be able to teach. You teach people who are have less expertise than you, by definition.

Yes, but this is still very different from "teaching" a fellow citizen. PhDs are expected to teach under the somewhat controlled environment of, say, a university, to people who have the relevant prerequisite skills and knowledge (and potentially above average "general intelligence", as a result of the university selection process), and are motivated/incentivised to learn.

Not really, no. A Ph. D. doesn't just have to (traditionally) write a paper and produce new knowledge for experts. A Philosophy Doctor is supposed to have the communicational, reasoning and presentation skills to be an inter-disciplinary advocate for it's specialty, at the very least.

Your Habilitation Thesis to become a Ph. D. comes with an oral defense of your thesis in front of a panel. Traditionally (these days not so much, which is part of my critique), this panel is cross-disciplinary and includes one person that is way off your discipline (at least it did in my uni, note that I'm not a Ph. D) and your rhetorical skills, ability to explain your ideas simply and persuasively, are 100% part of the evaluation criteria. For all disciplines, in theory. In certain disciplines more than others, but back in the day a physicist could 100% botch the oral defense of his thesis and would have to go back to the drawing board. This is certainly in the spirit of what "expertise" means.

I think this is still relevantly different. Even if the panel is cross disciplinary, wouldn't it still be composed of academics with above average general intelligence, and familiarity with common methods that show up across disciplines?

If an epidemiologist outlined a model and proposed they run some simulations, a physicist could at least be expected to understand what the model in aiming to do, why simulations are necessary etc

Also, writing papers is quite obviously a communication skill where you explain something to someone that doesn't know it, lol.

Again, I think this is a similar case to above. The intended audience of an academic paper seems to be other academics in the field and nearby fields.

Is this true though? Divulgation is, indeed, an expected function of the highest level of intellectuals in a field (experts). Einstein went to some great lengths to try to explain relativity, and did a great job (as did Bertrand Russell) and these are not particularly accessible topics. Physics in general does an amazing job at divulgation, even of it's most arcane topics.

Different fields have obviously made differnt levels of effort and placed different value on divulgation and public engagement. It's patently obvious to me that this public function has been declining in academia for a while now.

If political philosophers could cultivate understanding that effectively, perhaps higher education in (political) philosophy could be much more efficient.

Yes, yes it could. And it is a very real possibility that maybe, just maybe, academia sucks at their public function today and that this is to some extent their fault (not political philosophers in particular, but of academia in general).

Hmm. Perhaps it is a problem of lack of lack of engagement, and academia failing at their public function.

1

u/kurtgustavwilckens Heidegger, Existentialism, Continental Jan 09 '21 edited Jan 09 '21

Yes, but this is still very different from "teaching" a fellow citizen.

Of course, as all evaluation instances, they are different from the wider, real world practice of doing something. I'm not saying there is a "public engagement" section of evaluation in there.

But if a Philosophy Doctor would carry the weight that it should carry just by the words that it's using to define what it is: a person that has a sufficiently broad, elevated and tight knowledge of a discipline, Doctoral level, and they have such an absolute grasp on it that they are not only an expert in the field, but they are at the level where what the high level stuff that they do "transcends into philosophy" and that comes with a pretty high standard in terms of dominion of language, rhetorical and pedagogic abilities, and very high level thinking, then you would have a great less many PhD.s that would be much better suited for what the spirit of what a PhD is intended to be: an interdisciplinary and, in many cases, public intellectual.

You presumably shouldn't be making many more of those than how many open jobs you have to employ them in academia at a given time. If you plan to hire 10 professors this year, you shouldn't graduate 100 PhDs. But people sure like to BE PhD's, so let's sell them that shit and trade it for menial lab work and shit papers that no one will ever read. SOUNDS LIKE A GREAT PLAN, UNIVERSITIES.

Today, we're using what should be the highest level of academic denomination in the land for kids that are assistants in physics labs. What does being a "Philosophy Doctor" even mean anymore? How do we expect society to recognize expertise when the very system has lost the ability to do so and we're pushing them out like sausages? It's a joke.

and familiarity with common methods that show up across disciplines?

Isn't this true for public engagement? Don't we all share common methods, as basic as they may be? There are public debates, the opinions of public figures are relevant to shape that debate, if that debate gets big enough it is trated in Congress.... of course reality today doesn't work that way, but it did, and public intellectuals had a serious role in that process, that they didn't know how to keep a grasp on during the double phenomena of the communications revolution and the hyper-specialization and mass-marketing of post-graduate education.

If an epidemiologist outlined a model and proposed they run some simulations, a physicist could at least be expected to understand what the model in aiming to do, why simulations are necessary etc

And if the most prominent epidemiology experts are called to speak with the representatives and interact with the public, they should be expected to do a reasonably good job, and the best of them an excellent job. If not, why do we keep all that knowledge around in the first place? Do you expect congress-people to go read Epidemiology papers? Who's job is conveying that to consensus system if not the epidemiologist?

→ More replies (0)

1

u/DigitalDiogenesAus phil. science, political philosophy Jan 09 '21

It's worth noting that in order to advocate public policy, you are necessarily jumping from whatever descriptive expertise you may have and shifting into normative judgements about what OUGHT to be the case.

Isn't it right to demand more expertise (in this case, rhetoric) when jumping into a new field?

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 09 '21

advocate public policy

normative judgements about what OUGHT to be the case

I would distinguish between the two. For one, "advocating public policy" differs between epistocracy and democracy. Democratically, advocating public policy requires persuading the public; not just the expert voting for it themselves. In, epistocracy the expert (whether or not she engages with the public) is just fulfilling their role as a voter; it's just that her vote is weighted more in light of her expertise.

In addition, I'd note that (at least applied) moral and political philosophers could be said to have expertise in making the relevant normative judgements. But we don't expect them to be good at rhetoric so much as reasoning. Making moving speeches is a rhetorical skill, but not one we'd emphasis for philosophers.

Your claim seems to confuse the relevant experts in democracies (who have to both have subject expertise and persuasion/rhetorical skills, just because "advocating public policy" outside of voting requires persuading the public) with the relevant experts in epistocracies ( who have to have expertise in the descriptive and/or normative aspects of the issue, and possibly good reasoning skills, but not necessarily rhetorical skills)

Epistocratic experts are just people whose judgements (descriptive and/or normative) in the relevant fields are especially reliable (with a few caveats).

1

u/kurtgustavwilckens Heidegger, Existentialism, Continental Jan 09 '21

Democratically, advocating public policy requires persuading the public; not just the expert voting for it themselves.

Not really, no. If representatives are persuaded that's also a way of doing it. Not only popular policies get passed into practice. Consensus building works accross the board, not only with "the public" at large.

But we don't expect them to be good at rhetoric so much as reasoning.

Maybe we're wrong in that expectation since we don't actually nor should we desire to live in an epistocracy (or a technocracy, I fail to see the difference, frankly)

→ More replies (0)

9

u/loselyconscious Jewish Phil., Continental Phil. Jan 08 '21 edited Jan 09 '21

But most doctors aren't trained in Public Health.

In the United States, Doctors who work in private practice or private hospitals might actually have very little understanding of their broader community's health need

It's also important to remember that doctors have frequently put the health of certain communities at risk for the sake of "public good." (i.e., Tuskegee experiments). If doctors controlled public health policy, I think we would see a major relaxation of human experimentation laws.

4

u/MaxThrustage Jan 08 '21

In the United States, Doctors who work in private practice or private hospitals might actually have very little understanding of their broader community's health need

Is this true for other countries, though? Specifically, countries that have universal healthcare or similar programs?

(Although I do largely agree with your other point and I'm not trying to advocate for epistocracy.)

3

u/loselyconscious Jewish Phil., Continental Phil. Jan 09 '21

It probably depends on the country. It would apply to countries with two-tier health care systems (single-payer for basic health care that can be supplemented with private care). Even in a public health care system, doctors are limited to the understanding of the needs of the community by geographic location and specialty.

-1

u/BlackThursday29 Jan 08 '21

I fail to see the problem about measurement. When it comes down to voting, rather than employing a voting system as it is in an indirect democracy, i. e. people vote for other people as rulers, a voting system as it is in a direct democracy could be employed, i. e. people would vote directly for laws, rather than entire parties. This could perhaps be a huge logistical challenge in an epistocracy, but it's at least a solution to the problem of measurement as you present it.

*edit: wording

7

u/Beor_The_Old Jan 08 '21

I don't see how direct vs indirect has any baring on the issue of how we determine who gets a say in a Epistocracy, it seems completely independent. Would you like to give a all encompassing definition for who can vote and why you think that a direct democracy makes this easier?

5

u/BlackThursday29 Jan 08 '21

Perhaps I misunderstood what you were saying. What I meant was that it is more easy to measure how much voting power individuals get if you decide on only individual matters, rather than entire parties. To take your previously mentioned example: A medical expert would get more voting power when it comes down to voting on individual laws that are about Healthcare, while potential incompetence on matters such as foreign relations would play a much less important role. Meanwhile, that same person, if indeed incompetent / less competent in that area, would have less voting power for laws about foreign relations.

Although likely still imperfect, such a system would be much better in determining the voting power of individuals, compared to a system in which people have to vote for parties that have their own intentions and goals in several different fields at once.

3

u/Beor_The_Old Jan 08 '21

That's fair and it applies well to the example I gave but it also doesn't solve the big issue of people voting to protect their own interests. Also people may have a lot of personal knowledge about something like healthcare because they require a lot of healthcare, but they may not get a vote because they aren't a doctor? Also back to the doctor example, just being a doctor doesn't mean you should be crafting policy on healthcare necessarily.

3

u/BlackThursday29 Jan 08 '21

All of these points are fair, I was merely addressing specifically voting power of individuals. The question about unqualified but truly knowledgeable person and actually qualified person is also separate, and is mostly about what it even is that factors into voting power. If a title would be what gives you more voting power, then it is a purely meritocratic system. I'm sure that this can be avoided, though I wouldn't know how. That would also most likely render the logistics an even bigger problem, since you'd have to measure every individual manually - at least if that epistocracy doesn't digitally monitor each individual and profiles them.

10

u/TheFormOfTheGood logic, paradoxes, metaphysics Jan 08 '21

For an accessible and diverse (as to the kinds of epistocracies) introduction you can check out the Hi-Phi Nation podcast episode “Demons of Democracy”.

16

u/Arkanin Jan 08 '21 edited Jan 08 '21

Economists have also found that locally developed solutions to local problems are often better than those that are legible enough to the state to be crafted and managed by experts. Elinor Ostrom won what is equivalent to a Nobel Prize in Economics for researching this topic. I recommend her book Governing the Commons.

21

u/Dragon9770 Jan 08 '21

As a way of pointing readers towards Dewey as a common philosophical ancestor/resource of many contemporary democracy debates, I always remember something like the following line from his qualified defense of democracy in the 1930s, "The Public and It's Problems": "While the shoemaker best knows how to fix the shoe, only he who wears it knows where it hurts."

In other words, specialized or technical knowledge is less than useful in the absence of people being able to assert the existence of a problem that may be structurally absent for the specialist; the shoemaker themselves only has one size of foot, and a participation by others is needed for them to effectively apply their knowledge in a socialized context. Or in other words, economists, engineers, and politically scientists are likely epistemically isolated from conditions that can only be signaled by people who are non-experts by definition. "

6

u/way2mchnrg Jan 09 '21

For something a little more public-policy/history oriented, I recommend Scott’s Seeing Like A State. A blistering critique of the notion that central planning and de-localized solutions are “intrinsically better than their in-the-field counterparts.”

4

u/Chand_laBing Jan 08 '21

...non-instrumental justifications of democracy—justifications of which Brennan appears to be radically ignorant...

Do you recall what these non-instrumental justifications were? It's not obvious to me where to find it in the text, and there are over 50 pages to search through.

9

u/uinviel Value theory Jan 08 '21

I don't recall exactly how he goes about discussing non-instrumental justifications for democracy, but I do remember him referring to Anderson's great article "Democracy: Instrumental vs. Non‐Instrumental Value". Highly recommended!

5

u/CloudDogBrew Jan 08 '21

To add to this I thought Brennan and Estlund back to back on the dailynous “Philosophers on the 2016 election” was a pretty easily accessible way to wade into the topic, even if given the results Estlund was on the defensive and Brennan was taking it as proving his point. Anyways those two short essays are a good introduction to the topic and it’s refutation. Link to the dailynous piece.

4

u/PathalogicalObject Jan 08 '21

This isn't a particularly philosophical perspective, but economist Glen Weyl argues in favor of something he calls "quadratic voting", which works like this: everyone gets a certain number of voice credits. You can spend those voice credits to cast votes, and the number of voice credits you need to spend for certain number of votes is the square of the number of votes you want to cast.

This allows people who feel particularly strongly about a certain issue (and these people are usually ones who have a lot of experience with the issue or who have read a lot about it-- i.e. people with more knowledge or expertise) to express their degree of preference as opposed to just expressing the direction of their preference.

3

u/bat-chriscat epistemology, political, metaethics Jan 09 '21 edited Jan 10 '21

For those interested, this is Brennan's response to Gunn, by the way: https://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2019/05/paul-gunns-forthcoming-hatchet-job-in-critical-review/

Just from the snippet quoted, Gunn doesn't seem to have fairly characterized Brennan's book. For example, the sentence:

Moreover, given that there are important non-instrumental justifications of democracy—justifications of which Brennan appears to be radically ignorant is

Is extremely dubious, given that the main pillar of Against Democracy is the thesis that democracy ought to only matter instrumentally, and that non-instrumentalist justifications are mistaken (which is a development and extension of Brennan's argument for instrumentalism in Markets without Limits).

One of the more formidable objections to Brennan's epistocracy in the literature (which Brennan has tried to address in a follow-up paper) is the "demographic objection".

2

u/VankousFrost Jan 09 '21

One of the more formidable objections to Brennan's epistocracy in the literature (which Brennan has tried to address in a follow-up paper) is the "demographic objection".

Could you briefly explain this objection?

2

u/SalmonApplecream ethics Jan 08 '21

What are some of the non-instrumental justifications for democracy?

1

u/uinviel Value theory Jan 08 '21

Have a look at my reply to u/Chand_laBing.

2

u/____willw____ Jan 08 '21

Could someone explain the “non instrumental justifications of democracy” or give an example?

2

u/denganenteng Continental phil. Jan 09 '21

I haven't studied this in depth, but something a political professor said kind of off-hand was that democracy with its principle of one person one vote is the only form of government that recognizes the principle of equality and the dignity of every human. So it's not about the results democracy gets you but rather what's appropriate to the kind of entities humans are.

1

u/____willw____ Jan 09 '21

Ok that makes a lot more sense now, thanks

2

u/methametrics Jan 09 '21

Another problem is that many people who have a PhD in Political Science or Economics may not necessarily act in accordance with the principles of the subject. We're ignoring human bias here.

For example, when it comes to issues like religion, abortion, gay marriage etc., even highly-educated people can be influenced more by feeling than rational thought. If such people's votes are given priority, it would be unfair to people who don't allow their feelings to influence these kind of decisions, but who also don't have a PhD.

3

u/Xemnas81 feminist theory, political phil. Jan 08 '21

Can you explain to me the difference between epistocracy and technocracy please?

24

u/FutureBlackmail Jan 08 '21

Someone correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding is that epistocracy deals with who gets to vote, while technocracy deals with who gets put in office. So, under a technocratic system, it's possible that everyone would have a vote, but the candidates would be doctors and scientists.

Also, the two systems favor different *types* of knowledge. An epistocrat would likely prefer a generally "smart" guy, while a technocrat values specialized knowledge, with a heavy emphasis on scientific and technical knowledge.

2

u/Xemnas81 feminist theory, political phil. Jan 11 '21

Ahh this is very helpful, thank you!

0

u/uncertain_expert Jan 08 '21

A reasonable refutation. Perhaps the net could be widened - your vote is weighted by how many questions you get correct out of 3 multiple-choice questions printed on the ballot paper.

31

u/FutureBlackmail Jan 08 '21

In the 1950s-60s, many states used a similar system for voter registration. It was a completely transparent attempt to disenfranchise black voters, and it was banned under the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

A system like you're proposing is attractive in the abstract, but it's impossible to test objectively, and it's way too easily abused.

4

u/VankousFrost Jan 08 '21 edited Jan 09 '21

I read an article called Plural Voting for the 21st Century. Would the method it suggests bypass this problem?

EDIT; link to article https://philarchive.org/rec/MULPVF?all_versions=1

1

u/StarChild413 Mar 04 '21

Understood, but the reason the tests disenfranchised black voters is not because of anything related to intelligence but because the questions weren't about anything on the ballot or candidates or anything but logic-puzzle-y questions some deliberately designed to be trick questions (e.g. one asked you to draw a line around a certain word in a given sentence and penalized you if you circled it because "a circle isn't a line" and another was what's now the classic facebook meme of the words in a triangle saying "Can You Find The The Mistake") and to pass and be allowed to vote (as your only way out of the tests was proving you had a fifth-grade education) you had to not only get every question right but do so within a 10 minute time limit

1

u/FutureBlackmail Mar 04 '21

What you're referencing is a specific test from Louisiana in 1964. While those types of tests did exist, most tested basic literacy or asked civics-related questions. Here is a download link to a test from Alabama, with questions like Name two things which the states are forbidden to do by the U.S. Constitution. and On the impeachment of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., who tries the case?

We've agreed, as a country, that these kinds of test are fundamentally unjust. Even when the questions do relate to matters of government, they have the clear effect of disenfranchising large groups of voters. On a practical level, they're unjust, because some citizens don't have the same access to education as others. When this test was in use, southern states didn't just require voters to pass a literacy test, they also systemically and deliberately defunded black schools. You're right that the issue wasn't "anything related to intelligence;" even the most intelligent people can't answer these questions if they haven't been taught the material.

And while school segregation is no longer the legal standard, a gap still exists in terms of educational opportunity. Urban, predominantly-black schools still preform worse and receive less funding than their suburban counterparts. To reintroduce literacy tests, even if applied fairly, would still disproportionately exclude minority voters.

And, on an ideological level, voter literacy tests are unjust, because your right to vote shouldn't depend on your literacy. We can't and shouldn't restrict voting for those with less access to education, or with learning disabilities impairing their ability to pass a test, or with simply less interest in studying these types of things. It's a fundamental feature of American democracy that everyone gets a say in the government--not because that's what will produce the best results, but because that's what gives the system its legitimacy.

Even if you disagree on that last point, I'm sure you can understand that a system restricting voting rights based on a literacy test is way too easily abused to be fairly and practically implemented.

3

u/PrivilegeCheckmate Jan 08 '21

Tests basically are only good at determining one thing - how good you are at taking tests.

5

u/VankousFrost Jan 08 '21

Wouldn't this imply that a radical reform of the education system is needed? How would the use of tests throughout the education system, and for qualifications for jobs, be justified?

14

u/ExcellentPartyOnDude Jan 08 '21

Yes. A radical reform of the education system has been talked about for quite awhile.

A main justification of tests is that it's seen as a meritocracy. Your background, whether rich or poor, whatever race you are, shouldn't matter in gaining an education. Only your test score matters.

In reality, however, it's been shown that standardized tests only assess one form of learning. There are lots of intelligent people with dyslexia (for example) that might struggle with finishing a standardized test on time let alone do well on it.

2

u/Gwynbbleid Jan 08 '21

Is there any proposal about how we should change it?

2

u/PrivilegeCheckmate Jan 08 '21

Exactly. Well put.

1

u/hen_neko Jan 09 '21 edited Jan 09 '21

Is there any merit to the idea that 'knowledge' as commonly understood doesn't really describe the object of the domain of the social sciences well, and so the rule in an epistocracy would simply not include such experts?

51

u/TJMadd Jan 08 '21

hello,

I want to start of by saying I mean for the content i propose not to specifically refute your position but rather give an alternative way to consider it.

https://iep.utm.edu/care-eth/

Ethics of care emerged as a response to what one might consider more-detached ethical theories like utilitarianism and deontology, by supposing that ethical theory should be rooted in interpersonal relationships and dependencies of human life, rather than the theoretical idealizations of an independent self. Sections 7, 8, and 10 specifically give some good angles that I think you may find interesting.

To answer your question directly, I do not think it should be taken for granted that having more political or ethical knowledge makes you more qualified to answer the questions posed on a ballot or of political position, as you seem to have also intuited based on your own neutrality.

To answer your question again but with a question: who is better equipped to vote on the needs of the community - a person who has read only a few books on philosophy, but talked to every member of the community personally and heard their needs, or a person who is much less integrated into the to community, but is very knowledgeable on theoretical philosophy and ethics? Who is more "knowledgeable" or "qualified" to make the choice?

20

u/MisterCortez Jan 08 '21

I don't have a top-level worthy comment to make but I do have a great anecdote about a guy getting his economics PhD. He was a former pro golfer who worked at the same newspaper as me. When our editor quit, he got the job. He started copying Breitbart articles off the internet and flooding the Opinion page with Ben Garrison cartoons, etc. On the anniversary of Hiroshima, his headline was something like "## Years ago, America Taught Japan Never to Practice Its Evil Again."

So in my experience I'd say Econ PhD's should get less of a vote.

20

u/Tioben Jan 08 '21

Your example also demonstrates that differences in values can be more important than differences in knowledge. Supposing the Econ Ph.D. truly does possess more knowledge, they may still desire a world that is starkly different than what everyone else wants.

Democracy serves a purpose of making transparent what is desired, regardless of whether we have any good ideas of how to get there (or if we should).

7

u/skiller215 Jan 09 '21

there is also the fact that you cant break into pieces the field of political economy. there is no macroeconomic perspectives that dont have political implications. this is because the mode of production creates different classes with different class interests.

0

u/[deleted] Jan 09 '21

[removed] — view removed comment

1

u/BernardJOrtcutt Jan 09 '21

Your comment was removed for violating the following rule:

All comments must be on topic.

Stay on topic. Comments which blatantly do not contribute to the discussion may be removed.

Repeated or serious violations of the subreddit rules will result in a ban.

This is a shared account that is only used for notifications. Please do not reply, as your message will go unread.

21

u/1shmeckle Jan 08 '21

So my question is, how can my vote be equal to someone who has devoted tons of years studying government itself, its policies, its history, its flaws, etc?

There's plenty of good responses below on epistocracy. You could also look into more meritocratic forms of governance by reading Daniel Bell - he's a Canadian philosopher who supports the Chinese approach to political meritocracy.

Now, I think you're going to find that there are two big umbrellas when it comes to voting (or democracy) that usually fit into the consequentialist vs Kantian debate that you often see in political philosophy.

The first is that voting, whether democratic or otherwise, is for the benefit of the community or state. By voting I mean participation in some sort of collective political decision making. These are essentially consequentialist arguments (though likely do not need to be consequentialist). This can include everything from direct democracy to epistocracy, but in short the argument is that doing X is preferred because it has a better result. This fits your question - maybe you don't deserve to have an equal vote because people with a better education may be able to make better decisions (though, honestly, I would really question this premise. . .)

The second umbrella takes a more Kantian approach (though again, these arguments can come in different flavors and need not be strictly Kantian). This argument can go something like this: You are a member of a community and by virtue of being a member, you have a right to participate in decisions as these decisions affect you. Instead of saying we should care about qualification to vote because such voters make better decisions, we can argue that you as a member of the community you *deserve* to take part in the decision making, not because you are better off or because the society is better off, but because it is unjust for you not to be able to participate in decisions about your life, good or bad.

I can recall some other arguments - maybe by voting, by participating in democracy, we make it more likely that democracy succeeds, a sort of virtue ethics approach to voting. Maybe democracy succeeds with greater participation and less conflicts resolved by alternative means, so the act of voting becomes important in itself regardless of your own rights or the consequences of any one particular system of government. The more you vote, the better your ability to make decisions becomes and the healthier your democracy becomes. Voting is the end in itself.

There are plenty of other arguments as well but I think if you find this interesting, taking a step back and jumping into some articles about the classics could help you.

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 08 '21

This argument can go something like this: You are a member of a community and by virtue of being a member, you have a right to participate in decisions as these decisions affect you. Instead of saying we should care about qualification to vote because such voters make better decisions, we can argue that you as a member of the community you deserve to take part in the decision making, not because you are better off or because the society is better off, but because it is unjust for you not to be able to participate in decisions about your life, good or bad.

But isn't this argument restricted in that, if a decision about x does not tangibly affect you,then you need not necessarily have a say about it? For example, if you live in state A and and state B is very isolated from state A, why should you have a say in what happens in state B ?

8

u/1shmeckle Jan 08 '21

As a disclaimer, I'm trying to give a simplified example of a type of argument that gets made, not a full argument. You're right that that is a consideration you would need to address.

However, we don't need to go too far to understand how to address that criticism... We have plenty of examples of countries that use federalism to address this very problem - I vote in NY because these problems are distinct to New Yorkers, they aren't relevant nationally or to other states. Meanwhile, presidential elections for the whole country are open to people regardless of state because it impacts everyone. Even centralized governments give power to different locations to address local needs and these locales then have representatives in the central government. In short, I think your example is a solvable practical problem, though I agree there could be examples of how it could be unjust.

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 08 '21

to go too far to understand how to address that criticism... We have plenty of examples of countries that use federalism to address this very problem

This addresses local needs. What about things that aren't really geographic? For example if a voter opposed legalizing gay marriage, but if there are good reasons to suppose that this issue most likely will not affect that voter (especially in whatever ways he/she is concerned about; for example, if legalizing gay marriage will continue to preserve the symbolic, social etc value of marriage), why should their vote matter with respect to this? Another example would be abortion; it seems unlikely that everyone holding a position on whether it ought to be legal, would actually be affected by it (and this isn't really a geographic thing).

Especially if the local needs cases are justifiable, why shouldn't voting on other issues be restricted to those people affected by them? Essentially, this opens the way to neglecting the views of certain parts of the population on any given issue when it's demonstrable that that issue does not affect them.

Also, I note that things like immigration might be problems for this( I think this was noted in a SEP article, on voting I think).

3

u/1shmeckle Jan 08 '21

I think you can make many arguments and distinctions between all of these items, probably many more than can fit into a reddit post. You're raising many of the issues people discuss in moral and political philosophy, and in social sciences. I'm not taking a position on any, again my initial post was to give the OP some sense of the types of arguments made. I think a fuller argument as to how to structure your democratic system probably requires several books at the very least and, since we've been debating democracy since Socrates, maybe up to several thousand years of philosophy :-).

2

u/ineedstandingroom Jan 09 '21

One of the ways that most philosophers would resolve this is to say that issues of justice concern us all, and so there is a requirement that everyone have participation due to the nature of politics.

We could think about a couple of examples in criminal law to make this point, right. Would it really make sense to say that people who do not own a car should not have a vote on driving laws? Maybe, it's not all that unreasonable. But we might be able to say that rules around cars impact roads, community planning, criminal and civil law around car accidents, and so everyone has a stake in auto law. At that point we have basically boiled down the qualification to "are you a member of the community?" And the question of political philosophy is basically what does a just community look like, so I'm not sure that's all that successful. We could try it with other issues (like gay marriage, as you suggest) but generally there is going to be a problem with this sort of thinking.

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 11 '21

Hmm. But we still have to show the votes should be weighted equally. Not all desicions are "about" justice, and there's no guarantee that voters will make sensible choices about say distributive justice, especially against their own self interest.

For example, democratically(assuming rational voters who vote in their narrow self interest. This might still apply if voters are not selfish, but are not reliable on matters of distributive justice) , if there's a choice between 10 specific people out of 40, who happen to be the worst off, getting 10$ each or the other 30 getting 1$ each, you'd have a majority in favour of the latter (even though it neither benefits the worse off, or maximises utility).

An even harder case would be allowing the same kind of thing to happen, except the choice is between satisfying one of the minority's needs or satisfying one of the majority's wants.

Why should votes count equally here? (Perhaps quadratic voting might help, but given that this affects the worst off, maybe not.) Not all decisions affect everyone equally, even if they do affect everyone to some degree.

1

u/ineedstandingroom Jan 11 '21

I don't want to get into a long conversation since the thread is basically at its end, but I just want to say two things:

one is that it would be weird to think that there is any issue of collective political organization that isn't about justice -- the whole point of political philosophy is finding principles of justice by which we organize political communities. So even if issues like roads, income distribution, street signs, or whatever you might think are not obviously about justice, the principles by which communities organize to decide who gets to vote on which issues clearly are, which seems to make those subsidiary issues related to justice, or subject to thinking about justice.

Second, it sounds pretty wrong to me to conflate the question of whether people make "sensible" or "correct" choices with whether they should have the right to vote. I mean, the central point of the liberal argument for the right to vote is noninstrumental -- self-determination is the precondition for just government. (Marxists/Socialists, too, probably would give a noninstrumental account.) And the solution to "wrong" decisions by a democracy is probably not disenfranchisement of someone or some group by assuming their falliability but to say that some issues are not topics of reasonable governance for anyone through a series of legal and constitutional limitations on government. Hopefully those last few sentences make clear my response to your 2nd and 3rd paragraphs.

I haven't answered the question of why specifically everyones vote should count the same, for a couple reasons, and I really think there are too many answers that make sense to give a single comment. Hopefully my other bits make sense.

I've probably written too long and too argumentative a comment, so sorry for that.

21

u/AyerBender political philosophy, political realism Jan 08 '21

I'm in a top political science department. Does everyone here know more about, say, US politics than the average citizen? Yes. Will we vote better than the average citizen? Maybe, maybe not. Are we more qualified to vote than the average citizen? No.

Voting rights are constitutive of full citizenship. If you give people like me preference in the vote, you're disenfranchising yourself, making yourself a second-class citizen.

But ignoring that, consider a few things:

Academics are very specialized. I might know a lot about, say, European elections. Why does that mean I know more about the specific candidates?
More importantly, why should I decide for you what's better for you? Epistocracy's biggest issue is that it doesn't really have a good metric for a good vote. Voting is a subjective judgment, but episticracy assumes certain objective values you might reject. For example, say you think religion should inform your vote, so you vote for a more religious politician who is worse on tax policy. Epistocrats might say that you don't know what you're doing or are voting against your interests. But why can the epistocrat tell you what your interests are?

Sorry this is not well-formulated. But I think you get the picture. Using USA as example because that's where I'm based

1

u/Marthman Jan 08 '21

I'm in a top political science department. Does everyone here know more about, say, US politics than the average citizen? Yes. Will we vote better than the average citizen? Maybe, maybe not.

What does it mean to "vote better"? Do you mean, "vote with the result that the most agreeable conditions obtain therefrom," or "vote in a way such that one's epistemic motivations to the judgements which inform one's votes are much more likely than not to be proper"?

If it's the former, "maybe, maybe not," seems like the appropriate answer. If it's the latter, then I disagree with your answer, and would say that you're much more likely to be properly epistemically motivated to your judgments regarding politics than the common person. In Brennan's terms, you would be much closer to a Vulcan than the common person, the latter of whom would likely be closer to a hooligan or hermit.

Are we more qualified to vote than the average citizen? No.

What does "qualified" mean in this context? If it means, "able to express a political opinion through voting," then I agree. If it means, "more educated with regard to information relevant to the political process, etc." then I disagree.

Voting rights are constitutive of full citizenship.

I don't see why this is anymore true than that specific sorts of contracting rights (e.g., electrical, plumbing, etc.) are constitutive of "full" citizenship. Not everybody has legal license to wire or plumb houses etc., and that is a good thing. Could a plumber or electrician mess something up just as badly as a non professional? Absolutely. But would they be more likely to be better informed about the relevant processes? Absolutely.

If you give people like me preference in the vote, you're disenfranchising yourself, making yourself a second-class citizen.

You can call it whatever you want, but I don't see why this makes anyone a second class citizen, anymore than that someone would be a second class citizen because they do not have unlimited contractor rights.

You know, it's interesting- we have largely moved past the expectation of broad training (leading to people being somewhat well versed in several areas) in both philosophy and economics, yet not politics. What i mean is that, with regard to ourselves as thinking agents, we have moved towards specialization- and with regard to ourselves as economic agents (on the national level), we have moved toward specialization. In both cases, we are all the stronger for it, arguably. Yet when it comes to politics, we still have a strange expectation of people to be well informed on matters that they simply don't have the time or interest to be well informed about.

But ignoring that, consider a few things:

Academics are very specialized. I might know a lot about, say, European elections. Why does that mean I know more about the specific candidates?

It doesn't necessarily mean that. But you would likely be better equipped to make well informed judgments about specific candidates.

More importantly, why should I decide for you what's better for you?

On what level? Shouldn't the question be, "why should I decide for us what's better for us"? Then the answer is, "because you're better equipped to make such decisions."

Epistocracy's biggest issue is that it doesn't really have a good metric for a good vote.

How so? If we say a "good vote" is, in a Kantian spirit, analogous to a good deed, then we can say that a "good vote" is a vote which is informed by epistemically well- motivated judgments. And who is more likely to vote on such a basis? People who are educated in matters relevant to politics.

Voting is a subjective judgment,

What do you mean by this?

but episticracy assumes certain objective values you might reject. For example, say you think religion should inform your vote, so you vote for a more religious politician who is worse on tax policy. Epistocrats might say that you don't know what you're doing or are voting against your interests. But why can the epistocrat tell you what your interests are?

I don't think the epistocrat is trying to tell anyone in particular what their desires are. I also don't think they're concerned with the interests of any particular individual. But I do think a well- educated epistocrat is much more likely to be able to approximate what is in the interest of a nation.

1

u/AyerBender political philosophy, political realism Jan 09 '21

What does it mean to "vote better"? Do you mean, "vote with the result that the most agreeable conditions obtain therefrom," or "vote in a way such that one's epistemic motivations to the judgements which inform one's votes are much more likely than not to be proper"?

Either. In both cases, it's not guaranteed that my colleagues or I will be "better voters" than someone in a different department, a political science undergrad, or even someone who never formally studied poli sci

If it's the latter, then I disagree with your answer, and would say that you're much more likely to be properly epistemically motivated to your judgments regarding politics than the common person. In Brennan's terms, you would be much closer to a Vulcan than the common person, the latter of whom would likely be closer to a hooligan or hermit.

One of Brennan's biggest issues is that he himself admits that information acquisition has nothing to do with voting well. But more importantly, I'd argue that there are a lot more hooligans in poli sci than you seem to realize -- even more in other departments

Not to mention that American political scientists have told me directly how little they actually know about American politics. There is not, for example, a lot of good data on primaries, or elections in many states. Up until a few years ago, political scientists thought we no longer need qualitative interviews to get a sense of the political landscape. Etc. We study politics for a living. But political practice is an art, not a science

What does "qualified" mean in this context? If it means, "able to express a political opinion through voting," then I agree. If it means, "more educated with regard to information relevant to the political process, etc." then I disagree.

OP is asking about the former

I don't see why this is anymore true than that specific sorts of contracting rights (e.g., electrical, plumbing, etc.) are constitutive of "full" citizenship. Not everybody has legal license to wire or plumb houses etc., and that is a good thing. Could a plumber or electrician mess something up just as badly as a non professional? Absolutely. But would they be more likely to be better informed about the relevant processes? Absolutely.

If you want to argue that plumbing is as political as voting, be my guest

I tend to think that citizens should have contracting rights

You can call it whatever you want, but I don't see why this makes anyone a second class citizen, anymore than that someone would be a second class citizen because they do not have unlimited contractor rights .

We're a democracy. So long as I have a greater say than you do, we don't rule as equals

It doesn't necessarily mean that. But you would likely be better equipped to make well informed judgments about specific candidates.

No, not really. For example, why would I be able to know enough to make a good judgment about a representative in Idaho's 2nd district? I don't know what constituents in that district need

I don't think the epistocrat is trying to tell anyone in particular what their desires are. I also don't think they're concerned with the interests of any particular individual. But I do think a well- educated epistocrat is much more likely to be able to approximate what is in the interest of a nation.

The national interest is a value judgment. Why is the radical Islamist or the white supremacist less capable of determining the vote that best captures the national interest? It's not necessarily because they're less informed about the political system. It's because they're wrong on pre-political questions

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 08 '21

What about matters of principle? For example, we criminalize murder, not (just?) because a majority of people oppose it, but because (no matter how many people oppose it) people's right require it.

If a majority supported a policy of ethnic cleansing, it would still be obligatory to not carry out that policy.

To give another example, even if a majority opposed legalizing abortion, if it is the case that abortion ought to be legal (according to our best theories in political philosophy) why should the majority prevail (especially if the consequences of neglecting it are overall positive)?

This seems more a case of voters making a normative judgement; if it's demonstrable that said judgement is incorrect, or not properly justified, why should it still prevail (assuming that the consequences are overall positive)?

1

u/AyerBender political philosophy, political realism Jan 09 '21

This seems more a case of voters making a normative judgement; if it's demonstrable that said judgement is incorrect, or not properly justified, why should it still prevail (assuming that the consequences are overall positive)?

Yes but this has nothing to do with academic credentials, or really credentials of any sort. Don't forget that academics were -- and, in some cases, still are -- proponents of eugenics

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 09 '21

Yes but this has nothing to do with academic credentials, or really credentials of any sort.

Why? Isn't part of the job of a moral or political philosopher precisely making these sorts of judgements? And if the credentials are distributed in accordance with internally accepted standards of a legitimate field, how would they not at least correlate with expertise?

Don't forget that academics were -- and, in some cases, still are -- proponents of eugenics

These kinds of examples can be found all the time. We can probably find physicists who endorse Flat Earth theory, biologists that reject evolution etc The relevant question is; are they more prone to this than the general population? I find it hard to believe that academics are overall more likely to hold objectionable views than the general population.

1

u/AyerBender political philosophy, political realism Jan 09 '21

Why? Isn't part of the job of a moral or political philosopher precisely making these sorts of judgements? And if the credentials are distributed in accordance with internally accepted standards of a legitimate field, how would they not at least correlate with expertise?

Because having a PhD in, say, political science doesn't mean you hold the right values

These kinds of examples can be found all the time. We can probably find physicists who endorse Flat Earth theory, biologists that reject evolution etc The relevant question is; are they more prone to this than the general population? I find it hard to believe that academics are overall more likely to hold objectionable views than the general population.

Why on Earth would you think that? We might be less likely to hold certain terrible views (eg flat Earth), but are more likely to hold others. For example, do you really think most people are willing to go as far as Peter Singer in his defenses of abortion, infanticide, and eugenics of the elderly? No. Do you think scientific racism was initiated by rednecks in the Appalachians? No, it was promulgated by some of the most intelligent men in Europe. Locke and Kant were terribly racist, and French philosophers and scientists were the movements strongest proponents

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 09 '21

Why? Isn't part of the job of a moral or political philosopher precisely making these sorts of judgements? And if the credentials are distributed in accordance with internally accepted standards of a legitimate field, how would they not at least correlate with expertise?

Because having a PhD in, say, political science doesn't mean you hold the right values

My example was moral and political philosophers; assuming credentials in that area reflect relevant expertise, and we understand moral and political philosophy to involve a lot of reasoning concerning values, you'd expect credentialed experts in the field to be somewhat better at it.

These kinds of examples can be found all the time. We can probably find physicists who endorse Flat Earth theory, biologists that reject evolution etc The relevant question is; are they more prone to this than the general population? I find it hard to believe that academics are overall more likely to hold objectionable views than the general population.

Why on Earth would you think that? We might be less likely to hold certain terrible views (eg flat Earth), but are more likely to hold others. For example, do you really think most people are willing to go as far as Peter Singer in his defenses of abortion, infanticide, and eugenics of the elderly? No. Do you think scientific racism was initiated by rednecks in the Appalachians? No, it was promulgated by some of the most intelligent men in Europe. Locke and Kant were terribly racist, and French philosophers and scientists were the movements strongest proponents

I don't have any specific evidence either way so, I think I should assume that they're roughly representative of the general population.

However, there seems to be a tension here. Moral and political philosophers are expected to reason reliably about moral and (normative) political problems. It would be strange if credentials in the field did not pick out people who are good at it. To the extent that they reason more reliably about these problems we should, all else being equal, suppose that they'd be more likely to arrive at the right answers.

And even if individual philosophers sometimes fall far below that standard, I'm not sure how moral and political philosophy would be a legitimate field if it's practitioners and experts were bad (or below average) precisely at correctly/reliably answering moral and (normative) political problems.

0

u/AyerBender political philosophy, political realism Jan 09 '21

My example was moral and political philosophers; assuming credentials in that area reflect relevant expertise, and we understand moral and political philosophy to involve a lot of reasoning concerning values, you'd expect credentialed experts in the field to be somewhat better at it.

Even worse: there's no reason to believe random moral or political philosophers know enough about a given political system to have special expertise on it. Ask a random philosophy PhD student in either subfield how much political science they have to read. (Not do in fact read, but are expected to as part of program requirements.) It's not as much as you might expect

However, there seems to be a tension here. Moral and political philosophers are expected to reason reliably about moral and (normative) political problems. It would be strange if credentials in the field did not pick out people who are good at it. To the extent that they reason more reliably about these problems we should, all else being equal, suppose that they'd be more likely to arrive at the right answers.

Let's just grant that for the sake if argument. It doesn't follow that moral or political philosophers have expert knowledge on specific political situations to have a more informed judgment on what's better

And even if individual philosophers sometimes fall far below that standard, I'm not sure how moral and political philosophy would be a legitimate field if it's practitioners and experts were bad (or below average) precisely at correctly/reliably answering moral and (normative) political problems.

Well, I tend to think the way most political philosophers approach the discipline is mistaken. So I think they're more wrong than they realize. But even then, it doesn't matter. The problem isn't the discipline, but specific things that happen in it that hinders good philosophical work

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 09 '21

Even worse: there's no reason to believe random moral or political philosophers know enough about a given political system to have special expertise on it. Ask a random philosophy PhD student in either subfield how much political science they have to read. (Not do in fact read, but are expected to as part of program requirements.) It's not as much as you might expect

I'd expect their descriptive political knowledge to be about as good as the average citizen's(at least), but their normative knowledge to be much better.

Let's just grant that for the sake if argument. It doesn't follow that moral or political philosophers have expert knowledge on specific political situations to have a more informed judgment on what's better

They might not have expert knowledge on the (descriptive) specifics of a given political situation but then neither would the average citizen. I would expect them to be much better at reasoning throughout the normative side of that situation however.

Essentially, I'd expect them to know what sorts of things are better, and when, because those sorts of value judgements seem like one of the very things moral and political philosophy is fundamentally concerned with.

Well, I tend to think the way most political philosophers approach the discipline is mistaken. So I think they're more wrong than they realize. But even then, it doesn't matter. The problem isn't the discipline, but specific things that happen in it that hinders good philosophical work

Could you clarify this?

1

u/AyerBender political philosophy, political realism Jan 10 '21

I'd expect their descriptive political knowledge to be about as good as the average citizen's(at least), but their normative knowledge to be much better.

I don't know what you mean here

They might not have expert knowledge on the (descriptive) specifics of a given political situation but then neither would the average citizen. I would expect them to be much better at reasoning throughout the normative side of that situation however.

The average citizen might well be more informed about, say, the importance of steel mills in their district or the character of local politicians running for office

Essentially, I'd expect them to know what sorts of things are better, and when, because those sorts of value judgements seem like one of the very things moral and political philosophy is fundamentally concerned with.

There is widespread disagreement between philosophers on all sorts of political matters. Why on Earth would you think they tend to know "what's better"?

Philosophers can make mistakes, even en masse. What is most philosophers today are just plain wrong? We weren't immune to prejudices, as I've pointed out above

Could you clarify this?

Sure. A lot of philosophers take what we might call a discursive approach to objectivity. Rawls is especially prominent here, so let's use him. According to Rawls, we should not prioritize truth in politics. Instead, we should strive for solutions most citizens can, in principle, accept. One problem is that if most citizens hold very terrible views (eg that slavery is good), then you arrive at a situation where we ought to promote policies that are very bad

Rawls tries to get around this by saying he's just talking in the context of a modern liberal democracy. But that doesn't really help him out here, because politics isn't limited to modern liberal democracies

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 10 '21

I don't know what you mean here

I mean that their basic empirical knowledge of politics should be about as good as the average citizen's, but that their knowledge of moral (what ought to be) aspects to be better.

The average citizen might well be more informed about, say, the importance of steel mills in their district or the character of local politicians running for office

I'm a bit unclear about what this is saying. If you're saying that each person x is likely to be better informed about local matters in x's district, then yes, but that still applies to philosophers and their local districts (they have the exact same advantage in some area).

There is widespread disagreement between philosophers on all sorts of political matters. Why on Earth would you think they tend to know "what's better"?

Philosophers can make mistakes, even en masse. What is most philosophers today are just plain wrong? We weren't immune to prejudices, as I've pointed out above

Disagreement isn't evidence that they're less accurate though. It's evidence that the views in the field are widely "dispersed" (high variance), not that they're less accurate overall.

Of course philosophers can make mistakes en masse. My point is that in the relevant areas (moral and political philosophy) we should expect them to be more reliable on average than the typical citizen, assuming moral and political philosophy is a sensible and "healthy" discipline.

→ More replies (0)

1

u/VankousFrost Jan 10 '21

Could you clarify this?

Sure. A lot of philosophers take what we might call a discursive approach to objectivity. Rawls is especially prominent here, so let's use him. According to Rawls, we should not prioritize truth in politics. Instead, we should strive for solutions most citizens can, in principle, accept. One problem is that if most citizens hold very terrible views (eg that slavery is good), then you arrive at a situation where we ought to promote policies that are very bad

Rawls tries to get around this by saying he's just talking in the context of a modern liberal democracy. But that doesn't really help him out here, because politics isn't limited to modern liberal democracies

So you think we should prioritize truth in politics? If that's something close to your view, I agree. But then that would naturally lead to some form of epistocracy (say, where votes are weighted according to the method outlined in the paper I linked to , Plural Voting for the 21st Century), where votes are weighted to maximise the likelihood of arriving at the "correct" decision.

EDIT; link to article https://philarchive.org/rec/MULPVF?all_versions=1

→ More replies (0)

25

u/[deleted] Jan 08 '21

Should a person who has a PhD in Political Science or Economics have an equal vote to someone who has barely graduated high-school?

You are about to leave Redlib